Lessons Learned from Chinese Intelligence Officer Arrest by Vancouver, CASIS
 Key Events  
The following key events are discussed in this briefing note with specific 
application to cybersecurity practices which enables early detection and 
investigation of potential threats.  The following events are: 1) A press 
release (Oct 10, 2018) announcing Chinese Ministry of State Security 
(MSS) operative, Yanjun Xu, aka Qu Hui, aka Zhang Hui, has been 
arrested and charged with conspiring and attempting to commit 
economic espionage and steal trade secrets from multiple U.S. aviation 
and aerospace companies (Department of Justice, 2018). 2) A press 
release (Sept 25, 2018) announcing that the FBI arrested a Chinese 
national named Ji Chaoqun in Chicago working as an unregistered agent 
of China’s civilian intelligence agency targeting American defence 
contractors.  
Nature of Discussion 
These two incidents share the following common details:  
1. Both press releases refer to a Chinese intelligence officer, 
specifically a Deputy Division director with the Jiangsu Province 
MSS (Department of Justice, 2018; US District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio (Cincinnati), 2018). 
2. MSS Deputy Director Xu’s activity is dated to December 2013 
(US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Cincinnati) 
2018). 
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3. MSS Deputy Director’s activity for CHAOQUN is dated to June 
2003 (Gertz, 2018). 
4. CHAOQUN’s enlistment as U.S. Army Reserve program 
(Military Accession Vital to the National Interest program, 
known as MAVNI) (Gertz, 2018). 
5. Both involved have access to sensitive information.  
6. The use of human connections for intelligence gathering.  
Background 
Reports about the Chinese spy arrest, from authors such as Schoenberg 
and Strohm (2018) and Stewart from Stratfor (2018), point out the 
Chinese will continue to use technology and human intelligence sources 
to conduct espionage.  This is consistent with China’s military doctrine 
book “Unrestricted Warfare,” which identifies "financial warfare," 
"trade warfare," "economic aid warfare," "regulatory warfare," and 
"sanction warfare" (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999, p. 146).  The authors 
(Liang and Xiangsui, 1999) also provide insight into the ideal 
combinations of political, ideological and diplomacy rules which 
support these types of warfare.  Central to their insight, the notion of 
taking time and focusing on specific targets which improve China’s 
ability to be a world economic power.   
However, it is critical to point out the U.S. indictment for Xu contains 
references which confirm that physical security combined with 
information technology security does provide opportunities to intercept 
and disrupt these espionage efforts by China.   
For example, the US District Court of Southern District of Ohio 
(Western Division) Indictment Case 1:18CR-43 provides evidence 
which indicates Victim Company A and the targeted Employee 1 were 
able to coordinate a response to the enticements by Xu with Employee 
1 (U.S.A. v Yanjun Xu, 2018).  Mr. Xu’s enticements included paid trips 
to China, during which Employee 1 would present Victim Company A’s 
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specific aviation technologies associated with jet engine fan blades and 
fan containment structures. There are also direct instructions from Mr. 
Xu to Employee 1 to reveal commercial secrets, which would occur on 
a trip to European Union sometime Feb/Mar 2018. The indictment 
appears to be a coordinated effort by US officials and Victim Company 
A to meet with Mr. Xu and subsequently arrest and deport Mr. Xu from 
Belgium to the United States on April 1, 2018 (Delaney, 2018).  
The indictment also provides information about the physical and 
intellectual security measures of Victim Company A.  The security 
measures included limiting physical access to restricted portions of 
campus, use of manned, gated entrances and requiring identification and 
access badges.  Victim Company A also had employee non-disclosure 
and other confidentiality agreements that extend beyond the length of 
employment at Victim Company A; recurrent training and instruction 
for employees regarding the processes in place to safeguard restricted 
and confidential business information; notifying all employees that 
publication and/or disclosure of restricted or confidential company 
information is prohibited without express company authorization.  
Victim Company A also had various data security policies; and enforced 
limited access to company proprietary information to employees or 
contractors on a need-to-know basis. All of these security features 
appear to inform the merits of the case and helped inform Employee 1 
of his/her responsibility.  
 
Key Points of Discussion and West Coast Perspectives 
Key Point 1 - Strong Interagency and Infrastructure Information 
Sharing and Cooperation. As noted in the discussion points, Victim 
Company A and a U.S. agency were able to coordinate their responses 
with Mr. Xu which resulted in him being extradited from EU.  This 
speaks to the power of collaboration and knowing whom to collaborate 
with. PSC Canada (2016) provides ten critical infrastructure sector and 
specific federal department contacts.  However, Neilson (2017) suggests 
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there is a need for more public education, funding of cybersecurity, and 
the development and promotion of established standards, best practices, 
certification, and legislation.  Neilson’s closing comment is the most 
intriguing:  
“There appears to be an overemphasis on resilience, emergency management, 
and disaster recovery, thus presenting a policy of failure as the starting point of 
a strategy for cyber and critical infrastructure protection. Proactive cyber 
defence should be added” (p.42).  
Some participants indicated that actions to improve cybersecurity in 
Canada should be proactive in nature, instead of reactive. In fact, it was 
expressly stated by a few participants that the action areas given to them 
as examples in the workbook were too defensive, and should instead be 
more offensive in nature (Nielson, 2017 p. 42).  
How can Canada move to be a leader in proactive offensive 
cybersecurity to protect critical infrastructure?  
Key Point 2 - Public Safety Canada Fundamental of Cybersecurity 
for Canada’s Critical Infrastructure Community (2016) outlines 
threats to Canada’s digital economy (industrial espionage, state-
sponsored cyber espionage, criminals, hacktivists/recreational hackers, 
and insider threats).  The PSC document also clearly notes 
‘cybersecurity is everyone’s responsibility’, and also notes what those 
responsibilities. Should Canada specifically educate national 
infrastructure companies on the details of the Chinese threat and 
evaluate Chinese hosted conferences as potential espionage activities? 
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